

12 January 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Summary of the Report of the "Eberstadt" Committee

1. The essence of the "Eberstadt" Committee's task was to explore how the product of our National Security Establishment could be improved and, at the same time, the costs reduced -- how to obtain the maximum security at the minimum cost in terms of our resources and liberties. There is no simple, specific answer to this question. An appraisal of so far-reaching a system, so recently organized, would be difficult in any circumstances. It is particularly difficult amid severe internal and external strains. The Committee noted, even during the course of its sessions, encouraging evidence of progress -- the National Security machinery though still not working smoothly -- is steadily improving.

2. Its investigations convinced the Committee that there are six (6) major areas or aspects in which improvement in the interest of greater efficiency and economy is both possible and necessary. These may be summarized as follows:

a. Central authority in the National Military Establishment must be clarified and strengthened.

b. Military budget organizations and procedures must be improved, clarified and regularized.

c. Teamwork throughout the National Security Organization must be improved.

d. Scientific research and development must be placed on a sounder basis and related more closely to military policy and strategic plans.

e. A greater sense of urgency and more realism are demanded in civilian and industrial mobilization planning and in adjusting logistic requirements to available national resources.

f. Adequate provision must be made for our civil defense and internal security and vigorous attention given to new and unconventional methods of warfare -- psychological warfare, economic warfare, as well as the mass-destruction weapons of atomic, radiological, biological and chemical warfare.

(Deficiencies noted in each of these fields are set forth in Tab A).

3. A report of this kind necessarily focuses on deficiencies, but the Committee does not wish the critical nature of this report to suggest that it has failed to note and appreciate the substantial progress that has been made in many fields. Its recommendations are not offered in a spirit of hostile or captious criticism. (Favorable comments of the Committee are shown in Tab B).

4. On the basis of its findings and conclusions, the Committee has arrived at certain major recommendations. These are presented, grouped in accordance with the six (6) main areas established by the Committee. Both legislative and administrative action are required. (A brief of the Committee's recommendations is contained in Tab C).

5. The Committee considered and rejected three (3) proposals from which views Mr. Barnard, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Patterson, and General Wood dissent in certain particulars. (Dissenting opinions are briefed in Tab D).

6. The Committee is convinced that our national security system rests on solid foundations; and that the problem now is not how to replace them, but how to build on them -- firmly and intelligently. It concludes "The changes suggested by the Committee should be promptly made and then the organization should be given a breathing spell during which to strengthen its structure and perfect its operations."

4 Incls
Tabs A, B, C, D.

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REPORT OF THE EBERSTADT COMMITTEE
DEFICIENCIES

I. CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Central authority of the National Military Establishment must be clarified and strengthened.

1. Neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff is functioning entirely as intended. (p. 92)

2. The difficulties of the Secretary of Defense lie in vague authority, too great a burden of work and inadequate means of reaching and implementing his decisions. (p. 94)

a. Too much of his time and energy are now spent in efforts to resolve questions that the Joint Chiefs should be able to decide without his intervention. (p. 95)

b. There are no less than seventeen high officials in the military establishment, through and with whom he must work, but over whose appointment and removal he has no control. He should at least have some recognized consultative rights in the making of such appointments. (p. 95)

c. He should be relieved so far as possible of routine and detailed burdens. (p. 96)

d. Creation of an Under Secretary of Defense to act as the Secretary's deputy and assistant in all matters of concern to him is essential. (p. 97)

e. Under Secretaries of the three military departments should be eliminated. Each department should be limited to two Assistant Secretaries. (p. 98)

f. The Secretary of Defense should be authorized to appoint from among its members, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (p. 98)

g. The Secretary of Defense should avail himself of the present provisions of the National Security Act to appoint a Principal Military Assistant to aid him with Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military matters. (p. 98)

h. The Chairman of the Research and Development Board should be given broad power of decision. (p. 101)

i. The Chairman of the Munitions Board should also be given broad power of decision. (p. 102)

j. The National Security Act should be amended to clarify the extent of the authority of the Secretary of Defense to enforce uniform policies applicable to all three services in the fields of public relations, personnel policies, legislation, medical services and hospitalization, and others of like character. (pp. 106-107)

k. Adequate boards and staff units, if not now existing, should be created in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to exercise central control of policies in the fields mentioned in paragraph 2j. (pp. 107-108)

1. The Secretary has concerned himself with too many matters that should be dealt with by establishment of policy-making mechanisms and by delegation to them of adequate authority. (p. 108)

m. The Secretary should bring the War Council into more active use. Its membership should be enlarged and it should be provided with a strong secretariat. (pp. 108-109)

n. The National Security Act should be amended so as to strengthen the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense. (pp. 109-110)

3. The root of the trouble with the Joint Chiefs of Staff is fourfold: (p. 112)

a. They have, as an agency, kept themselves too remote from the other parts of the National Security Organization, and too detached from the vitally important political, economic, and scientific factors that must enter into all valid strategic plans. (p. 112)

b. The individual Chiefs of Staff have allowed themselves to be influenced far too much by considerations of service particularism and aggrandizement, and have failed sufficiently to recognize and accept their responsibilities as an integrating agency of national military policy. (pp. 112-113)

c. Individually they have been too heavily burdened with departmental obligations to give to their important duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time and thought that those duties demand. (p. 113) Each Chief must organize his own departmental office in such a way that he can devote a larger part of his time to Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. (p. 118)

d. The Joint Chiefs have been burdened with too many minor matters. (p. 113)

4. The present limitation of 100 officers on the Joint Staff is too restrictive. Some definite limitation, however, is sound. (p. 119)

II. MILITARY BUDGET

Military budget organizations and procedures must be improved, clarified and regularized.

5. The military budget needs a major overhaul. The principal major defects in budgetary organization and procedure within the services are: (p. 122)

a. Some degree of vagueness in the budgetary authority of the Secretary of Defense. (p. 122)

b. Inadequate (though improving) administrative machinery in the Secretary's office and in the three military departments. (p. 122)

c. Wide dissimilarity among the three services in budgetary organization. (p. 122)

d. Lack of reasonable uniformity in budgetary accounting, terminology and classification, making valid comparisons impossible. (p. 122)

e. Inadequate breakdowns within the budget for each service, making it difficult or impossible to determine for what the money is actually being spent. (p. 122)

6. The Secretary of Defense needs a strong budget organization. (p. 123)

a. Present budget staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not yet adequate to furnish the necessary guidance and supervision to the services in budgetary, fiscal, and management matters. (p. 124)

b. Careful review of budgets from an over-all defense policy standpoint and effective supervision of budget program execution throughout the year are vitally necessary if the Secretary's office is to ensure translation of policies into practice. (p. 124)

7. Adjustments in Congressional procedures are in order. (p. 125)

III. TEAMWORK

Teamwork throughout the National Security Organization must be improved.

8. There is need for a broad policy study to determine the relationships in peace and war between: (p. 128)

a. The Maritime Commission and the Navy Department. (p. 128)

b. The Air Force and the civilian air lines. (p. 128)

c. The military services and the civilian transportation industry. (p. 128)

d. The military services and labor unions in time of war, particularly in the maritime and air transport field. (p. 128)

e. A strong merchant fleet and a strong civilian air fleet. (p. 128)

9. There is need for improvement in lateral teamwork in the relations between: (p. 128)

a. The Department of State and the National Security Council.

The National Security Council has not yet produced a comprehensive statement of current and long-range policies. (p. 129)

b. The Central Intelligence Agency and the agencies it serves.
(p. 129)

- (1) The relationships of this agency to some of the other intelligence agencies of Government--notably to G-2 of the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department have been and still are unsatisfactory. (p. 131)
- (2) Too many disparate intelligence estimates have been made by the individual departmental intelligence services; these separate estimates have often been subjective and biased; the capabilities of potential enemies have frequently been interpreted as their intentions; a more comprehensive collection system, better coordination and more mature and experienced evaluation are imperative. (pp. 131-132)
- (3) The Central Intelligence Agency is not now properly organized. (p. 132)
- (4) Co-equal improvement in G-2, FBI, ONI, State Department and other Government intelligence services is also essential. (p. 132)
- (5) Somewhat haphazard method employed by the services in the selection of officers for important intelligence posts. G-2 in the Army has had seven chiefs in seven years, some of them with no prior intelligence experience whatsoever. (p. 132)
- (6) Inadequacies in the fields of scientific and medical intelligence. (p. 133)

c. Department of State and the military departments. (p. 129)

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and numerous other agencies. (p. 129)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are too remote from related groups--National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Resources Board, Research and Development Board, Munitions Board. (p. 135)

e. National Security Resources Board and agencies and departments with which it should be working closely. (p. 129)

10. Many of the existing agencies of interservice and interdepartmental coordination on the working level are insufficiently active or are endowed with insufficient or unclear authority by delegation from their chiefs. This comment is applicable, among others, to the War Council; the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, and the Intelligence Advisory Council. (p. 136)

11. Service estimates of their medical and dental needs are excessive and are much higher in proportion to numbers of personnel than in civilian life. The utilization of doctors in administrative rather than in medical positions, maldistribution of medical personnel, wasteful medical practices and the diversion of service medical efforts to care for a great patient load of service dependents, veterans, and various Federal employees contribute to the apparent service shortage. (p. 140)

12. The Army now supplies medical services and hospitalization to the Air Force, an arrangement outside the chain of Air Force command, which does not meet Air Force needs. (p. 142)

13. The Army medical service should be raised to an organizational level equivalent to that in the Navy. (p. 142)

14. Education and training of military officers needs attention. (p. 143)

a. There is need to develop joint thinking on a wider basis and at an earlier stage than that presently accomplished by these higher schools--National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Staff College. (p. 143)

b. More attractive careers in specialized services should be opened to officers. (p. 144)

c. Most careful consideration should be given at this time to the entire system of officer education, including ROTC, and other methods of developing officers before deciding finally on the establishment of an air academy. (p. 146)

d. There is urgent need for improvement in curriculum and instruction and better integration of the various ROTC systems now in use. (p. 146)

e. There is need for the indoctrination of students at service schools in cost consciousness, and for the teachings of fiscal practices, the functions of a controller, cost-accounting, etc. (p. 146)

15. Improvement in public relations must be made. (p. 147)

a. There is need for a better understanding of the harm done to the military services by competitive publicity efforts and for a higher sense of loyalty to the organization as a whole. (p. 147)

b. Lack of harmony among the civilian and military heads is demoralizing to the services and distressing to the public. Limiting the right to express opinions, even in the military establishment, calls for considerable discretion. (p. 147)

c. A tighter and more effective control of policy than has heretofore existed seems desirable. (p. 147)

16. There should be much greater opportunity, within the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, for the transfer of officers from one service to another. (p. 148)

17. Reorganization of military departments would improve lateral coordination. (p. 149)

a. A considerably greater symmetry can be achieved with benefit to the military establishment as a whole and to the several services. (p. 150)

b. The organizational structures of the three military departments should be studied particularly from the point of view of assuring their readiness to respond immediately to the needs of emergency or of war. (p. 150)

IV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Scientific research and development must be placed on a sounder basis and related more closely to military policy and strategic plans.

18. Research and strategic plans must be brought closer together. (p. 151)

a. A satisfactorily "complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes" does not exist. (p. 152)

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board do not yet sufficiently understand one another and the respective fields and limitations of each. (p. 152)

19. The Research and Development Board must establish a firmer measure of control over the research programs of the military services. (pp. 152-153)

a. Without guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to ultimate objectives, it is impossible to fit 18,000 research and development projects now sponsored or conducted by the services into any kind of master plan. (p. 153)

b. The research budgets are made up, moreover, with such wide variations in accounting practices and reflect so many differences in organizational patterns as to be of little value in showing what is actually going on or the effectiveness of the results. (p. 153)

c. The service research programs and research appropriations are now often in excess of available technical manpower. (p. 154)

20. A National Science Foundation should be established at the earliest opportunity and contracts for basic research should then be administered by the Foundation. (pp. 154-155)

21. Out of a total research budget of more than \$600 million in the fiscal year 1949, the services are spending only \$6 million, or less than one per cent in the field of human resources. (p. 155)

22. The impact of military research contracts upon universities involved presents a number of serious problems. (p. 155)

V. MOBILIZATION PLANNING

A greater sense of urgency and more realism are demanded in civilian and industrial mobilization planning and in adjusting logistic requirements to available national resources.

23. The National Security Resources Board needs basic policies and firm direction. (p. 159)

- a. It has failed to develop a sufficiently clear grasp of its own duties and potentialities. (p. 159)
- b. The functions of the Board are not clear to those departments and agencies whose services it should use. (p. 159)
- c. There is a want of effective working relationships between the Board and the White House and the Bureau of the Budget. (p. 159)
- d. There should be more intimate cooperation between the National Security Resources Board, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission. (p. 160)
- e. Further study of decentralization, dispersion and the feasibility of underground installations is needed. (p. 160)
- f. Plans of the military services for moving command centers in case of emergency do not appear to be sufficiently definite. (p. 160)
- g. Neither definite plans for economic warfare nor any organization to handle it were advanced to a point where they were available for examination by the Committee. (p. 161)

24. The condition of the stockpile is deplorable. (p. 161)

- a. There is not single, centralized responsibility and direction of stockpiling and stockpile policy anywhere within the Government. (p. 161)
- b. Efforts should be made to discover what amounts of critical materials the military services already have on hand, where and in what condition they are, so that the stockpile will not be duplicating in its purchases items that are already present in ample amounts. (p. 162)

25. The Munitions Board should be so organized as to be able to implement any plan on short notice, rather than be geared inflexibly to a single plan. (p. 162)

26. Vagueness of authority surrounds the statutory position of the Chairman of the Munitions Board. (p. 163)

27. Many areas in the industrial field require attention to achieve efficiency and economy. (p. 163)

VI. CIVIL DEFENSE, ETC.

Adequate provision must be made for our civil defense and internal security and vigorous attention given to new and unconventional methods of warfare--psychological warfare, economic warfare, as well as the mass destruction weapons of atomic, radiological, biological and chemical warfare.

28. The permanent Office of Civil Defense should promptly be established as part of the National Security Resources Board. (p. 165)

29. Internal Security deserves more careful and intelligent attention than it seems thus far to have received. (p. 166)

30. Present facilities and mechanisms for the waging of psychological warfare are inadequate. (p. 167)

REPORT OF THE EBERSTADT COMMITTEE
FAVORABLE COMMENTS

I. CENTRAL AUTHORITY

1. Real advances toward integration have been made: (p. 74)

a. In budgetary matters, public relations, handling of legislative matters, education and training, a great deal of unpublicized day-to-day cooperation on working levels, recent apportioning by the Munitions Board of procurement responsibilities among the services. (p. 74)

b. Consolidation of the Air Force and Naval Air Transport systems into the Military Air Transport Service. (p. 74)

c. Joint educational facilities and joint training -- notably Joint Air Force-Navy Air training. (pp. 74 & 138)

2. Physical manifestations of unification are: (p. 75)

a. Recent move of senior civilian and military officers of the Navy to the Pentagon. (p. 75)

b. Establishment of single (unified) commands in most overseas areas. (pp. 74 & 114)

c. Studies by the Munitions Board's Committee on Facilities and Services covering joint use of reserve training, recruiting, munitions storage, transportation, cold storage, and other facilities. (p. 75)

d. Pilot study of consolidations in the west coast area. (p. 75)

e. Joint use by all services of the hospital facilities in Panama and the Norfolk area. Similar joint use in Hawaii, Guam, and in various parts of the United States is being studied. (p. 75)

f. There are many more examples. (p. 75)

3. Statistical and reporting organizations in the Secretary's office are being built up but require further strengthening and, in the exercise of his power over the budget, the encouraging progress already made in his office needs strong support so that it may realize its full potentialities. (p. 107)

II. MILITARY BUDGET

4. Some progress in the practice of economy has already been made but there is still a long way to go. This is not a fault of the military services alone; it is a reflection of America, a huge, sprawling, wasteful land. (p. 18)

5. Recently the Secretary of Defense has undertaken to exercise supervision of service requests for authorizations. This is a sound move. (p. 123)

a. The excellent form of organization set up in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Special Assistant in charge of budget, finance, reports, and administration should be strengthened with additional qualified personnel. The progress already achieved justifies confidence as to the future. (p. 124)

b. In the formulation of the military budget estimates for the Fiscal Year 1940, the Committee is encouraged by the progress that has been made. Through the firm persistence of the Secretary of Defense, the estimates initially submitted by the services have been reduced by substantial amounts. (pp. 22 & 126)

III. TEAMWORK

6. The National Security Council has made considerable progress, especially in recent months. (p. 129)

a. It is now itself handling major occupation questions. (p. 130)

b. It is interesting to note that the President has never received a "split paper" from the National Security Council. (p. 130)

7. Through Staff Agencies established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense progress has been made toward common policies in many important fields. (p. 137)

a. An over-all legislative program for the entire military establishment is being prepared. (p. 137)

b. A Personnel Policy Board, to establish just and equitable practices in this field, is in process of formation. (p. 137)

c. A special study is being made of pay rates and retirement benefits of both regular and reserve components of the armed services. (pp. 137 & 148)

d. In the important field of military justice an interdepartmental board is preparing a uniform code for the three services. (p. 137)

e. Extensive studies looking to greater cooperation in the field of medical services and to a larger measure of joint use of hospital facilities have been undertaken. A number of study group's recommendations have already been put into effect. (p. 138)

8. Among the various studies that have been conducted as a result of War Council action, particular reference should be made to the study and report of the Gray Board -- described by the Secretary of Defense as "one of the most thorough and constructive jobs, in the field of national security, that has taken place in a number of years". (p. 138)

9. A greater central control of activities in the field of public relations is being achieved. (p. 138)

10. The Munitions Board has made progress toward common policies in allocating procurement responsibilities among the services. The Board has also taken steps to conserve war plants and machine tools and has made strides in the development of a uniform catalog and common classification of like items. (p. 138)

11. The War Council has become increasingly active in initiating joint studies in a great variety of fields. (p. 139)

12. The importance of establishing common policies and eliminating duplications in many fields is becoming more generally recognized within the military establishment, coupled with a growing desire to accomplish them. (p. 139)

13. The higher military schools operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- the National War College, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College -- are excellently conceived. (p. 143)

14. The successful separation of the Air Force from the Army -- a gigantic and complicated operation, entailing not only the severance of old interservice relationships but the establishment of countless new ones -- could not have been performed without a high measure of sincere interservice cooperation. (p. 74)

IV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

15. The Research and Development Board appears to have made considerable progress. (p. 152)

a. The Board is to be complimented upon the success with which it has introduced over two thousand top-level civilian scientists, on part or full-time basis, alongside the military personnel throughout the establishment. No one expressed greater appreciation of this accomplishment than the military people themselves. (p. 155)

b. The Board has appointed a committee to draft a plan for the mobilization of the scientific resources of the country in the event of another war. (p. 155)

V. MOBILIZATION PLANNING

16. The National Security Resources Board has done an excellent job in preparing stand-by war control legislation to be submitted to Congress at the next session. (p. 161)

17. The Committee has been advised that the position of the stockpile with respect to certain critical items has improved since the time of its investigation, and that funds appropriated for stockpile purposes have now been fully committed. (p. 21)

VI. CIVIL DEFENSE, ETC.

18. A study instituted by the Secretary of Defense has developed a plan for a civil defense organization. It should be cleared with various agencies concerned and the final plan adopted. (p. 165)

19. The question of defensive psychological warfare requires no special attention at this time, and it would indeed be unwise to attempt anything of this kind. (p. 167)

20. The National Security Organization has made some progress in its provisions for defense against new and unconventional methods of war. (p. 167)

21. The huge tasks that the National Security Organization was established to perform are inordinately difficult; its responsibilities are intricate and often unclear. The organization itself is enormous, complex, and subject to internal contradictions. It affects nearly every aspect of our national life. Such an organization cannot be moulded to perfection over night. (pp. 12-13)

22. Our present system, created by the National Security Act of 1947, is a long step forward. In terms of progress, compared with what existed at the beginning, or even at the end, of World War II, the advances have been considerable. (p. 13)

23. The national security machinery -- though still not working smoothly -- is steadily improving. (p. 22)

24. Substantial progress has been made in many fields. (p. 25)

25. The Committee has been tremendously impressed by the fine spirit with which particularly the younger officials and officers who appeared before it have accepted the basic principles of the National Security Act and have shown hopeful confidence in working within the framework that it sets up. This seems to the Committee a point of real importance. It confirms the Committee's conviction that our national security system rests on solid foundations. (p. 25)

26. Extreme and dogmatic conclusions, based on evidence drawn from such limited and formative operations, are not justified. (p. 66)

27. The deficiencies noted by the Committee are due primarily to the fact that the integrating processes provided by the National Security Act are not yet operating smoothly and effectively. (p. 67)

28. In the course of its examination, the Committee has seen many weaknesses removed; it has watched the organization steadily growing in strength, unity, and effectiveness. (p. 73)

29. It is encouraging to note that some deficiencies, on which the Committee would undoubtedly have made recommendations, have been remedied before this report could be written. It is even more encouraging to note that within the military services it is, in general, the younger officers who have expressed the greatest confidence in the principles of the Act and the greatest readiness to work within the framework it establishes. They did not share the doubts expressed by some of their elders. (p. 73-74)

30. Secretary of Defense Forrestal's concept of progress by evolution rather than revolution is sound. (p. 76)

REPORT OF THE EBERSTADT COMMITTEE
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

I. CENTRAL AUTHORITY

1. That the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense, as set forth in Sec. 202 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947, be clarified and strengthened. (p. 26)

2. That the Secretary of Defense be relieved, so far as possible, of the burden of routine administration. (p. 29)

3. That adequate organizational mechanisms to implement the authority of the Secretary of Defense, in addition to those presently in existence, be provided. (p. 30)

II. MILITARY BUDGET

4. That the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the military budget be so clarified and strengthened as to enable him to exercise firm control and supervision over all phases of the budgetary process in the military services. (p. 31)

5. That adjustments be made in Congressional procedures regarding military appropriations. (pp. 33-34)

III. TEAMWORK

6. That more adequate organizational ties be established amongst the several agencies and departments in the National Security Organization, and particularly amongst those comprised in the National Military Establishment in order to promote a fuller measure of teamwork, a stronger consciousness of mutual interrelation, fuller consideration of all pertinent elements in the preparation of plans, unity of purpose in their execution, and a sense of the importance of economy. (p. 35)

IV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

7. That immediate steps be taken to establish closer working relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board to assure that advances in weapons and weapons systems be adequately considered in the formulation of strategic plans. (p. 41)

8. That, subject to the direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Research and Development Board participate in determination of the budgetary estimates for research and development and in reviewing expenditures for these purposes by the three services so as to enable the Board to carry out its statutory duty to "prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes." (p. 41)

V. MOBILIZATION PLANNING

9. That more vigorous attention be given to the prompt preparation of sound and adequate mobilization plans for both government agencies and for industry so that the delays and deficiencies connected with such mobilization in World Wars I and II may be avoided in any future emergency, when in all probability no margin of time for error will be available. (p. 43)

VI. CIVIL DEFENSE, ETC.

10. That appropriate steps be taken:

a. To secure the life and property of all citizens against subversive efforts. (p. 45)

b. To minimize the effects of internal damage in case of war. (p. 45)

c. To guard against attacks by unconventional means and weapons. (p. 45)

d. To develop effective and comprehensive psychological warfare and economic warfare programs. (p. 46)

VII. GENERAL

11. The changes suggested by the Committee should be promptly made and then the organization should be given a breathing spell during which to strengthen its structure and perfect its operations. (p. 170)

REPORT OF THE EBERSTADT COMMITTEE
DISSENTING OPINIONS

The Committee considered and rejected three (3) proposals from which action certain members dissent as follows:

1. A single military Chief of Staff and General Staff over all three military services. (p. 24)

a. Mr. Barnard favors such an arrangement, especially under emergency or war conditions. He believes it safer, more efficient and more effective. (pp. 101-101a)

b. Mr. McCloy also favors this arrangement. He considers it essential in case of war. He does not insist that the Chief of Staff be given over-all command in time of peace. He believes that such a Chief of Staff should sit as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, be a member of the National Security Council, and be a subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. (pp. 101a-101e)

2. Merger of the three military departments into a single department. (p. 24)

Mr. Patterson favors a single Department of Defense with three (3) branches under the management of the Secretary of Defense. His reasons briefly are these:

a. National Defense is a single problem. (like foreign relations)

b. Simplicity of structure, important in any organization, is of prime importance in a military establishment.

c. Actual experience with the present organization proves that too much recognition was given to divisive influences and not enough to unifying elements. (pp. 171-177)

3. Merger of the Naval Air Arm with the Air Force. (p. 24)
General Wood dissents from the entire discussion. He feels that the Committee had insufficient time for study to make an intelligent recommendation. It is the largest element in the unification program and involves the largest expenditures. Unification will never be complete and satisfactory until this point is decided. Accordingly, he recommends that Congress appoint a committee of experts, civilian and military, to study this problem and make recommendations to the Congress. (p. 82)